Conventional models of single district plurality elections show that with three parties anything can happen -extreme policies can win regardless of voter preferences. I
Introduction
Plurality rule (a.k.a. first-past-the-post) is used to elect legislatures in the U.S., U.K., Canada, India, Pakistan, Malaysia as well as a host of other former British colonies -yet we know very little about how it performs in such settings. The literature on single district elections shows that plurality rule performs well when there are only two candidates but poorly when there are more.
1 Indeed, plurality has recently been deemed the worst voting rule by a panel of voting theorists. 2 However, the objectives of voters are different in single district and legislative elections. In a legislative election, many districts hold simultaneous plurality elections and the winner of each district takes a seat in a legislature. Once all seats are filled, the elected politicians bargain over the formation of government and implement policy. If voters only care about which policy is implemented in the legislature, they will cast their ballots to influence the outcome of the legislative bargaining stage. A voter's preferred candidate will therefore depend on the results in other districts. Meanwhile, in a single district election, a voter's preference ordering over candidates is fixed, as only the local result matters. These different objectives are at the heart of this paper. I show that when three parties compete for legislative seats and voters care about national policy, several negative properties of plurality rule are mitigated. While there has been some key work on voting strategies in legislative elections under proportional representation (PR), notably Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) and Baron and Diermeier (2001) , there has been scant attention paid to the question of how voters should act when three parties compete in a legislative election under plurality rule. Studies of plurality rule have either focused on two-party legislative competition or else on three-party single district elections, in which voters only care about the result in that district. In the former case, as voters face a choice of two parties, they have no strategic decision to makethey simply vote for their favourite. However, for almost all countries using plurality rule, with the notable exception of the U.S., politics is not a two-party game: the U.K. has the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats; Canada has the Conservatives, Liberals, and New Democrats; India has Congress, BJP and many smaller parties.
3 With a choice of three candidates, voters must consider how others will vote when deciding on their own ballot choice. In a single plurality election, only one candidate can win. Therefore, when faced with a choice of three options, voters who prefer the candidate expected to come third have an incentive to abandon him and instead vote for their second favourite, so that in equilibrium only two candidates receive votes. These are the only serious candidates. This effect, known as Duverger's law 4 , was first stated by Henry Droop in 1869:
"Each elector has practically only a choice between two candidates or sets of candidates. As success depends upon obtaining a majority of the aggregate votes of all the electors, an election is usually reduced to a contest between the two most popular candidates or sets of candidates. Even if other candidates go to the poll, the electors usually find out that their votes will be thrown away, unless given in favour of one or other of the parties between whom the election really lies." (Droop cited in Riker (1982) , p. 756)
A vast literature has pointed out two negative implications of Duverger's law in single district elections.
5 First, "anything goes": the equilibrium is completely driven by voters'
beliefs, so any of the three candidates could be abandoned, leaving the other two to share the vote. This means that, regardless of voter preferences, there can always be polarisation -where a race between the two extreme choices results in an implemented policy far away from the centre. Second, when each of the three choices is preferred by some voter, there will always be misaligned voting. That is, some people will vote for an option which is not their most preferred. Misaligned voting undermines the legitimacy of the elected candidate: one candidate may win a majority simply to "keep out" a more despised opponent, so the winner's policies may actually be preferred by relatively few voters. In this paper, I compare my model of legislative elections with "national" voters, who care only about government policy, to the two other types of plurality elections typically studied in the literature: (1) single district elections such as presidential elections, and (2) legislative elections with "local" voters i.e. where voters only care about the winner in their own district. I show that the two negative properties of plurality elections -polarisation and misaligned voting -while always present in the traditional cases, need not hold in my setting.
The intuition for the polarisation result is as follows. For any party to win a majority of seats it must be that they are preferred to some alternative by a majority of voters in a majority of districts. In a presidential election or a legislative election with local voters, it can always be that voters focus on races between the left and right candidates, ignoring the centrist candidate. In such cases we would witness non-centrist policies, for any distribution of voter preferences. Instead, in a legislative election with national voters, the alternative to a left majority will generally not be a right majority but rather a moderate coalition government. Therefore, for an extreme policy to come about, it must be that the median voter in the median district prefers this policy to the moderate coalition policy.
The misaligned voting result stems from the fact that voters condition their ballots on a wider set of events in my setting. In a standard plurality election, voters condition their vote on the likelihood of being pivotal in their district. However, in a legislative election, national voters will condition their ballot choice on their vote being pivotal and their district being decisive in determining the government policy. In many cases a district will be decisive between two policies, even though there are three candidates. For example, a district might be decisive in either granting a majority of seats to a non-centrist party, say the left party, or bringing about a coalition by electing one of the other parties. Under many bargaining rules this coalition policy will be the same regardless of which of the weaker parties is elected. So, voters only face a choice between two policies: that of the left party and that of the coalition. When voters have a choice over two policies there can be no misaligned votingeveryone must be voting for their preferred option of the two.
I examine the workings of my model under several legislative bargaining settings -varying the scope of bargaining, the patience of politicians, and the bargaining protocol. Government formation processes do vary across countries. In some countries potential coalition partners may bargain jointly over policy and perks, while in others perks may be insufficient to overcome ideological differences. The patience of politicians will also differ across countries depending on aspects such as how quickly successive rounds of bargaining occur, and how likely politicians are to be re-elected.
6 A further feature of government formation which has been studied extensively is the protocol for selecting a formateur (a.k.a. proposer). The two standard cases are random recognition -where a party's probability of being the formateur in each round of bargaining is equal to its seat share -and fixed order -where the largest party makes the first offer, then the second largest, and so on. Diermeier and Merlo (2004) analyse 313 government formations in Western European over the period 1945-1997 and find the data favours random recognition rule. On the other hand, Bandyopadhyay, Chatterjee, and Sjöström (2011) note that a fixed order of bargaining is constitutionally enshrined in Greece and Bulgaria, and is a strong norm in the U.K. and India, where elections are held under plurality rule.
In my benchmark model, parties in the legislature bargain only over policy and they do not discount the future. Here, if no party holds a majority of seats, the median party's policy will be implemented. Two clear predictions emerge from this benchmark model. First, when the median party wins at least one seat, polarisation is mitigated: the policy of the left or right party can only be implemented if a majority of voters in a majority of districts prefer it to the policy of the median party. Second, if either the left or right party is a serious candidate in less than half of the districts, there can be no misaligned voting. These results change somewhat under different bargaining rules, but their flavour remains the same. When parties bargain over perks of office as well as policy, the polarisation result is strengthened -it is even more difficult to have extreme outcomes -while the misaligned voting result is weakened -it can only be ruled out if a non-centrist party is serious in less than a quarter of districts.
Finally, when politicians are impatient, I show that if a country uses a fixed order of recognition there will be a higher incidence of coalition governments than if it uses a random recognition rule, all else equal. The reason is that a fixed order rule gives a significant advantage to the largest party and also makes it easier for voters to predict which government policy will be implemented after the election. As the difference in policy between, say, a left majority government and a coalition led by the left is quite small, voter preferences must be very much skewed in favour of the left party in order for it to win a majority. With a random recognition rule, however, risk averse voters will prefer the certainty of a non-centrist single-party government to the lottery over policies which coalition bargaining would induce. This paper contributes primarily to the theoretical literature on strategic voting in legislative elections. The bulk of this works has been on PR. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) find that, with a minimum share of votes required to enter the legislature, the median party will receive just enough votes to ensure representation, with the remainder of its supporters choosing to vote for either the left or right party. Baron and Diermeier (2001) show that, with two dimensions of policy, either minimal-winning, surplus, or consensus governments can form depending on the status quo. On plurality legislative elections Morelli (2004) and Bandyopadhyay, Chatterjee, and Sjöström (2011) show that if parties can make pre-electoral pacts, and candidate entry is endogenous, then voters will not need to act strategically. My paper nonetheless focuses on strategic voting because in the main countries of interest, the U.K. and Canada, there are generally no pre-electoral pacts and the three main parties compete in almost every district, so strategic candidacy is not present. The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I introduce the benchmark model and define an equilibrium. In Section 3, I solve the model and show conditions which must hold in equilibrium. Section 4 compares the level of polarisation and misaligned voting in the benchmark model with that of the other plurality elections typically studied in the literature. Section 5 adds perks of office to the bargaining stage of the model, while Section 6 shows how the benchmark results change when parties discount the future. Finally, Section 7 discusses the assumptions of the model and concludes.
Model
Parties There are three parties; l, m, and r, contesting simultaneous elections in D districts, where D is an odd number. The winner of each of the D elections is decided by plurality rule: whichever party receives the most votes in district d ∈ D is deemed elected and takes a seat in the legislature. The outcome from all districts gives a distribution of seats in the legislature, S ≡ (s l , s m , s r ), with party c ∈ {l, m, r} having s c seats and c s c = D. Party c has a preferred platform a c in the unidimensional policy space X = [−1, 1] on which it must compete in every district. A party cannot announce a different platform to gain votes; voters know that a party will always implement its preferred platform if it gains a legislative majority. Once all the seats in the legislature have been filled, the parties bargain over the formation of government and implement a policy z. As such, a party cannot commit to implement its platform as the policy outcome z depends on bargaining. Party c has the payoff W c = b c − (z − a c ) 2 , linear in its share of government benefits b c , and negative quadratic in the distance between its platform a c and the implemented policy z. A feasible allocation of benefits is b = (b l , b m , b r ) where each b c is non-negative and c b c ≤ B.
The benchmark model I use is that of Baron (1991) , where B = 0 so that bargaining is over policy alone.
8 In Section 5, I consider the more complicated case of B > 0 due to Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) . If a party has a majority of the seats in the legislature it can form a unitary government and will implement its preferred policy. If no party wins an outright majority we enter a stage of legislative bargaining. I consider two bargaining protocols: one in which the order of bargaining is random and one in which it is fixed. Under the former rule, one party is randomly selected as formateur, where the probability of each 8 A large literature has grown from legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , in which legislators bargain over the division of a dollar. See Baron (1991) , Banks and Duggan (2000) , Baron and Diermeier (2001) , Jackson and Moselle (2002) , Eraslan, Diermeier, and Merlo (2003) , Kalandrakis (2004) , Banks and Duggan (2006) , and many others. Morelli (1999) introduces a different approach to legislative bargaining whereby potential coalition partners make demands to an endogenously chosen formateur. In contrast with the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) setup, the formateur does not capture a disproportionate share of the payoffs. party being chosen is equal to its seat share in the legislature. The formateur proposes a policy in [−1, 1] , which is implemented if a majority of the legislature support it; if not, a new formateur is selected, under the same random recognition rule, and the process repeats itself until agreement is reached. Under the fixed order rule, the party with the largest number of seats proposes a policy in [−1, 1] , which is implemented if a majority of the legislature support it; if not, the second largest party proposes a policy. If this second policy does not gain majority support, the smallest party proposes a policy, and if still there is no agreement, a new round of bargaining begins with the largest party again first to move. I assume for now that parties are perfectly patient, δ = 1, but this is relaxed in Section 6. A party's strategy specifies which policy to propose if formateur, and which policies to accept or reject otherwise.
Voters Individuals are purely policy-motivated with quadratic preferences on X. As such, a voter does not care who wins his district per se, nor does he care which parties form government; all that matters is the final policy, z, decided in the legislature. A voter's type, t ∈ T ⊂ X, is simply his position on the policy line; his utility is u t (z) = −(z − t)
2 . I assume T is sufficiently rich that for any tuple of distinct policies, {a l , a m , a r }, there is at least one voter type who prefers one of the three over the other two. Furthermore, I assume for simplicity that there is no type which is exactly indifferent between two platforms. Let V ≡ {v l , v m , v r } be the set of feasible actions an individual can take, with v c indicating a vote for party c. Voting is costless; thus, there will be no abstention. Following Myerson (2000 Myerson ( , 2002 , the number of voters in each district d is not fully known but rather is a random variable n d , which follows a Poisson distribution and has mean n. The probability that there are exactly k voters in a district is P r[n d = k] = e −n n k k! . Appendix A summarises several properties of the Poisson model. The use of Poisson games in large election models is now commonplace as it simplifies the calculation of probabilities while still producing the same predictions as models with fixed but large populations.
9
Each district has a distribution of types from which its voters are drawn, f d , which has full support over [−1, 1] . The probability of drawing a type t is f d (t). The actual population of voters in d consists of n d independent draws from f d . A voter knows his own type, the distribution from which he was drawn, and the distribution functions of the other districts, Myerson (1998) ). Given the various σ t,d 's, the expected vote share of party c in the district is
which can also be interpreted as the probability of a randomly selected voter playing v c . The expected distribution of party vote shares in
, but this is uncertain ex ante. As the population of voters is made up of n d independent draws from f d , where E(n d ) = n, the expected number of ballots for candidate c is E( At this point, I could define an equilibrium of the game; however, it is more convenient to define equilibrium in terms of pivotality and decisiveness, so I first introduce these additional concepts below.
Pivotality, Decisiveness and Payoffs A single vote is pivotal if it makes or breaks a tie for first place in the district. A district is decisive if the policy outcome z depends on which candidate that district elects. When deciding on his strategy, a voter need only consider cases in which his vote affects the policy outcome. Therefore, he will condition his vote choice on being pivotal in his district and on the district being decisive. The ability to do so is key, as if a voter cannot condition on some event where his vote matters then he does not know how he should vote. party l, m, or r respectively. Note that these policies need not correspond to the announced platforms of the parties -typically coalition bargaining will lead to compromised policies. It is useful to classify decisive events into three categories. Let λ(3) be a decisive event where all three policies z i l , z i m , and z i r are different points on the policy line; let λ(2) be a case where two of the three policies are identical.
11 Furthermore, let λ(2 ) be an event where there are three different policies but one of them is the preferred choice of no voter. For this to be the case, the universally disliked policy must be a lottery over two or more policies. Two decisive events λ i and λ j are distinct if z i = z j . Let Λ be the set of distinct decisive events;
this set consists of I elements, where λ i d is the i-th most likely decisive event for district d. As we will see, the number and type of decisive events in the set Λ depends on the legislative bargaining rule used.
Let G t,d (v c |nτ ) denote the expected gain for a voter of type t in district d of voting for party c, given the strategies of all other players in the game -this includes players in his own district as well as those in the other D − 1 districts. The expected gain of voting v l is given by
(2) with the gain of voting v m and v r similarly defined. The probability of being pivotal between two candidates, P r[piv d (c, c )], depends on the strategies and distribution of player types in that district, summarised by τ d , while the probability of district d being decisive depends on the strategies and distributions of player types in the other D − 1 districts, τ −d . The best response correspondence of a type t in district d to a strategy profile and distribution of types given by τ is
Timing The sequence of play is as follows:
1. In each district, nature draws a population of n d voters from f d .
2. Voters observe platforms {a l , a m , a r } and cast their vote for one of the three parties. Whichever party wins a plurality in a district takes that seat in the legislature.
3. A government is formed according to a specified bargaining process and a policy outcome, z, is chosen.
Equilibrium Concept The equilibrium of this game consists of a voting equilibrium at stage 2 and a bargaining equilibrium at stage 3. In a bargaining equilibrium, each party's strategy is a best response to the strategies of the other two parties. I restrict attention to stationary bargaining equilibria, as is standard in such games.
12
The solution concept for the voting game at stage 2 is strictly perfect equilibrium (Okada (1981) ).
13 A strategy profile σ * is a strictly perfect equilibrium if and only if ∃ > 0 such
That is, the equilibrium must be robust to epsilon changes in the strategies of players. Bouton and Gratton (2012) argue that restricting attention to such equilibria in multi-candidate Poisson games is appropriate because it rules out unstable and undesirable equilibria identified by Fey (1997) . If, instead, Bayesian Nash equilibrium is used there may be knife-edge equilibria in which voters expect two or more candidates to get exactly the same number of votes. Bouton and Gratton (2012) also note that requiring strict perfection is equivalent to robustness to heterogenous beliefs about the distribution of preferences, f . As I am interested in the properties of large national elections, I analyse the limiting properties of such equilibria as n → ∞.
Equilibrium
I solve for the equilibrium of the game by backward induction. The bargaining equilibrium at stage 3 follows from Baron (1991) . Of greater interest to us is the voting equilibrium at stage 2. While there are multiple voting equilibria for any distribution of voter types, I show that every equilibrium has only two candidates receiving votes in each district and I present several properties which must hold in any equilibrium.
Stage 3: Bargaining Equilibrium When no party has a majority of seats and δ = 1, in any stationary bargaining equilibrium z = a m is proposed and eventually passed with probability one.
14 This is regardless of whether the protocol is fixed order or random. To see this, note that if any other policy is proposed, a majority of legislators will find it worthwhile 12 An equilibrium is stationary if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium and each party's strategy is the same at the beginning of each bargaining period, regardless of the history of play.
13 The original formulation of strictly perfect equilibrium was for games with a finite number of players; Bouton and Gratton (2012) extend this to Poisson games.
14 For a proof see Jackson and Moselle (2002) .
to wait until a m is offered (which will occur when party m is eventually chosen as formateur).
The equilibrium policy outcome of the legislative bargaining stage is then
Every feasible seat distribution is mapped into a policy outcome, so, at stage 2, voters can fully anticipate which policy will arise from a given seat distribution. The set of distinct decisive events is given by Proof. See Appendix A.
It is perhaps unsurprising that there are multiple equilibria and districts are always duvergerian, given the findings of the extensive literature on single district plurality elections. The logic as to why races are duvergerian is similar to the single district case; voters condition their ballot choice on being pivotal and decisive, and as n → ∞, the most likely pivotal and decisive event is infinitely more likely to occur than any other pivotal and decisive event.
15
Thus, voters need only consider the most likely event in which their district is decisive and their own vote is pivotal. This greatly simplifies the decision process of voters and means they need only consider the two frontrunners in their district. While we cannot pin down which equilibrium will be played, the following properties will always hold.
1. In each district only two candidates receive votes; call these serious candidates.
If
candidate c is the expected winner and his probability of winning goes to one as n → ∞. Let d c denote such a district.
The expected seat distribution is E(S)
4. A district with c and c as serious candidates will condition on the most likely decisive event
The fourth property says: if a district's most likely decisive event, λ 1 d , is of the type λ(3) or λ(2 ), then voters must be conditioning on this event; if λ 1 d is of type λ(2), voters will be conditioning on it only if they are not indifferent between the two serious candidates.
Analysis of Benchmark Model
This section presents the main results of the paper. I compare my model of national voters, who care only about policy z, with two other types of plurality elections: (1) single district elections such as presidential elections, and (2) legislative elections with local voters i.e. where voters only care about the winner in their own district. I contrast the degree of polarisation and misaligned voting possible in each. The proofs of results in the rest of the paper rely on graphical arguments, hence, a slight detour is needed to explain this approach.
Recall, from Equation 5, that there are three distinct decisive events a district may condition on:
The first two are λ(2) events while the final one is a λ(3) event. A λ(a l , a m , a m ) event occurs when a district is decisive in determining whether l wins a majority of seats and implements z = a l , or it falls just short, allowing a coalition to implement z = a m . Here, voter types t < a l +am 2 ≡ a lm will vote v l while those of type t > a lm will coordinate on either v m or v r , as they are indifferent between the two policies offered. Similarly, in a λ(a m , a m , a r ) event, a district can secure party r a majority of seats or not; those with t < a mr will vote either v l or v m , while the rest will choose v r . Finally, when a district finds itself at a point λ(a l , a m , a r ), it is conditioning on l and r winning half the seats each before d's result is included:
). Electing either l or r would give them a majority, while electing m would bring about a coalition. Therefore, depending on the result in d, any of the three policies a l , a m or a r could be implemented. These three distinct decisive events are represented in Figure 1 . The simplex represents the decision problem of voters in district d, holding fixed the strategies of those in the other D − 1 districts.
16 Each point corresponds to an expected distribution of D − 1 seats among the three parties: the bottom left point corresponds to Each district will condition on one of the distinct events λ ∈ Λ when voting, and this must be consistent with the equilibrium properties given in the previous section.
, and all d r have E(S −dr ) = E(s l , s m , s r − 1). In Figure 1 this corresponds to the various E(S −d ) forming an inverted triangle: E(S −dr ) is one point west of E(S −d l ), while E(S −dm ) is one point south-west of E(S −d l ).
Polarisation
Much attention in the U.S. has focused on how a system with two polarised parties has led to policies which are far away from the median voter's preferred point. 17 The same problem may also arise if there are three parties but one of them is not considered a serious challenger. An open question is the degree to which policy outcomes reflect the preferences of voters in a legislative election with three parties. Let E(t d ) be the expected position of the median voter in district d, and label the districts so that E(t 1 ) < . . . < E(tD+1 shows that, while polarisation of outcomes can always occur in the plurality settings usually considered in the literature, an extreme policy can only be implemented in my benchmark model if it is preferred by the median voter in the median district.
Proposition 2. For any distribution of voter preferences, 1. In a presidential election or a legislative election with local voters, equilibria always exist where either z = a l or z = a r .
2. In a legislative election with national voters, δ = 1, E(s m ) > 0 and where bargaining occurs over policy, z = a l can only be implemented if the median voter in the median district prefers policy a l to policy a m ; that is, if E(tD+1
Proof. Case 1: In a presidential election, any two of the three candidates may become focal. If l and r are the serious candidates, then we must have either z = a l or z = a r . Whichever of the two wins, depends on the location of the median voter.
Case 2: In a legislative election with local voters, each district will focus on a race between any two of the three candidates. There must be at least D+1 2 districts with either E(t) < a lr or E(t) > a lr . If these districts have l and r as serious candidates, the outcome will be either z = a l or z = a r .
Case 3: In a legislative election with national voters and E(s m ) > 0, for the policy to be z = a l it must be that E(S −d ) is in the bottom right triangle of Figure 1 for all districts. Any d l district must be conditioning on either a λ(a l , a m , a m ) event or a λ(a l , a m , a r ) event. However, given E(s m ) > 0, the probability of a λ(a l , a m , a m ) event is strictly less than the probability of a λ(a l , a m , a r ) event, making the former is infinitely more likely. Therefore, these d l districts must be conditioning on λ(a l , a m , a m ) and as l is the expected winner, must have E(t) < a lm . It follows that for z = a l to be implemented, the median of median voters must be E(t D+1 2 ) < a lm . The proof for z = a r is analogous.
The proposition gives a novel insight into multiparty legislative elections under plurality. In the U.K., until recently, a vote for the Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) has typically been considered a "wasted vote".
18 The popular belief was that the Lib Dems were not a legitimate contender for government and so, even if they took a number of seats in parliament, they would not influence policy. As a result, centrist voters instead voted for either the Conservatives or Labour. My model shows that electing a Lib Dem candidate is far from a waste. Electing just one member of the median party to the legislature will be enough to bring about that party's preferred policy unless voter preferences favour one of the noncentrist parties very much. Indeed, the result suggests that concerns about the average voter not being adequately represented in the U.K. or Canada are misplaced. If the Conservatives win a majority in parliament it must be that a majority of voters in a majority of districts prefer their policy to that of the centrist Lib Dems/Liberals. On the other hand, a coalition implementing z = a m can come about for any distribution of voter preferences.
19 Supporters of the Lib Dems in the U.K. and the Liberals in Canada are therefore hugely advantaged by the current electoral system; it is the supporters of the non-centrist parties who are disadvantaged.
Misaligned Voting
All voters are strategic: a voter chooses his ballot to maximise his expected utility; which ballot this is depends on how the others vote. In any given situation, an individual may cast the same ballot he would if his vote unilaterally decided the district, or the strategies played by the others in the district may mean his best response is to vote for a less desirable option. Following Kawai and Watanabe (2012) , I call the latter misaligned voting.
Definition. A voter casts a misaligned vote if, conditioning on the strategies of voters in other districts, he would prefer a different candidate to win his district than the one he votes for.
If a voter casts a misaligned vote, he is essentially giving up on his preferred candidate due to the electoral mechanism. In the two types of plurality elections usually considered in the literature, there will always be misaligned voting: In a presidential election there is only one district -all citizens vote in the same plurality election -so there is no conditioning on other districts. With candidates l, m and r, one of them will receive no votes, for the usual reason of voters conditioning on the most likely pivotal event. Whichever candidate is least likely to be pivotal will be abandoned by his supporters, leading to a two-party race. Therefore, either all types with t < a lm , all types with t > a mr , or those in the interval in between will cast a misaligned vote. In a legislative election with local voters, individual's payoffs depend only on the result in their own district, so there is no conditioning on other districts. Each district is akin to its own presidential plurality election with three choicesso once again there must be misaligned voting. There may be more or less misaligned voting in a presidential election than in a legislative election with local voters, but there will always be a significant level of misaligned voting in each. In contrast, Proposition 3 below shows that there are many equilibria of the legislative election with national voters in which there is no misaligned voting.
Proposition 3. For any distribution of voter preferences, 1. In a presidential election or in a legislative election with local voters, every equilibrium has misaligned voting.
2. Under a legislative election with national voters, bargaining over policy and δ = 1, there always exist equilibria with no misaligned voting in any district. These occur when party l or r receive votes in fewer than
Proof. By Proposition 1, only two candidates will receive votes in each district. With D districts there will be 2D serious candidates. If party r's candidates are serious in less than
districts, party r can never win a majority of seats. If party r's candidates are serious in less than
districts, the decisive event in which an extra seat for party r gives them a majority can never come about. Therefore, in any equilibrium where party r is serious in less than
districts, the only decisive event voters can condition on is λ(a l , a m , a m ). As this is the only decisive event, in each district, voters with t < a lm will vote v l while those with t > a lm will vote for whichever of m or r is expected to receive votes. As long as less than
of these districts coordinate on r, there will be no misaligned voting. An analogous result holds when party l is serious in less than
The crux of the proposition is that when one of the non-centrist parties is a serious candidate in less than half the districts, only one distinct decisive event exists. This event is a choice over two policies; with only two policies on the table there is no strategic choice to make -voters simply vote for their preferred option of the two. So, there can be no misaligned voting. A voter with t > a lm facing a λ(a l , a m , a m ) decisive event is indifferent between electing m or r; he will vote for whichever of the two the other voters are coordinating on.
The proposition gives us a clear prediction on when there will and will not be misaligned voting with three parties competing in a legislative election. It shows that the conventional wisdom -no misaligned with two candidates, always misaligned with three -is wide of the mark; whether there is misaligned voting or not depends on the strength of the non-centrist parties. The proposition also has implications for the study of third-party entry into a twoparty system. Suppose, as is plausible, that a newly formed party cannot become focal in many districts -maybe because they have limited resources, or because voters do not yet consider them a serious alternative. Either way, an entering third-party is likely to be weaker than the two established parties. Proposition 3 tells us that if a third party enters on the flanks of the two established parties, then there will be no misaligned voting and no effect on the policy outcome as long as this party is serious in less than half the districts. On the other hand, if a third party enters at a policy point in between the two established parties, this can shake up the political landscape. First of all there will necessarily be misaligned voting, and second of all the policy outcome could be any of a l , a m or a r depending on which equilibrium voters focus on. Success for the new party in just one district can radically change the policy outcome. The implication is that parties in a two-party system should be less concerned about the entry of fringe parties and more concerned about potential centrist parties stealing the middle ground.
Legislative Bargaining over Policy and Perks
While the model of bargaining over policy in the previous section is tractable, it lacks one of the key features of the government formation process: parties often bargain over perks of office such as ministerial positions as well as over policy. Here, as parties can trade off losses in the policy dimension for gains in the perks dimension, and vice versa, a larger set of policy outcomes are possible. This section will show that, nonetheless, the results of the benchmark model extend broadly to the case of bargaining over policy and perks.
The following legislative bargain model with B > 0 is due to Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) . As usual, if a party wins an overall majority it will implement its preferred policy and keep all of B. Otherwise, the parties enter into a stage of bargaining over government formation. The party winning the most seats of the three begins the process by offering a policy outcome y 1 ∈ X and a distribution of a fixed amount of transferable private benefits across the parties,
It is assumed that B is large enough so that any possible governments can form, i.e. l can offer enough benefits to party r so as to overcome their ideological differences. If the first proposal is rejected, the party with the second largest number of seats gets to propose (y 2 , b 2 ). If this is rejected, the smallest party proposes (y 3 , b 3 ). If no agreement has been reached after the third period, a caretaker government implements (y 0 , b 0 ), which gives zero utility to all parties. At its turn to make a proposal, party c solves max
where W c is the continuation value of party c and the formateur makes the offer to whichever party is cheaper. Solving the game by backward induction, Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) show that a coalition government will always be made up of the largest party and the smallest party. They solve for the equilibrium policy outcome, for any possible distance between a l , a m and a r . Table 1 shows the policy outcome for each seat distribution and distance between parties, where l l ≡ a m − a l and l r ≡ a r − a m . I assume if two parties have exactly the same number of seats, a coin is tossed before the bargaining game begins to decide the order of play. So, if s l = s r > s m , then with probability one-half, the game will play out as when s l > s r > s m and otherwise as s r > s l > s m .
The set of possible policy outcomes depends on the number of seats in the legislature, and on the distance between party policies. The simplex in Figure 2 shows what the policy will be, for any seat distribution, when there are 25 districts and l l < l r ≤ 2l l . Notice that there are far more policy possibilities than in the case of B = 0. Figure 3 shows the various decisive cases from the perspective of a single district; it is the analogue of Figure 1 . While there are many more decisive cases than when B = 0, they can be grouped into the three categories defined previously: λ(2), λ(2 ) and λ(3) events.
The following proposition shows that, even when parties can bargain over perks as well as policy, a non-centrist party can only win a majority if the median voter in the median district prefers its policy to that of the centrist party.
Proposition 4. In a legislative election with a fixed order of bargaining over policy and perks of office and E(s m ) > 1, z = a l can only be implemented if E(tD+1 2 ) < a lm . Similarly, z = a r can only be implemented if E(t D+1 2 ) > a mr .
Proof. Suppose we have l l < l r ≤ 2l l , as in Figure 3 . If the policy outcome is z = a l and the median party is expected to win more than one seat, each d l district must be conditioning on one of the following events: λ(a l , a m , a m ), λ(a l , a lm , a lm ), or λ(a l , a m , a lm ). If a district is conditioning on a race between policies a l and a m , then a l will win if E(t) < a lm . If it is conditioning on a race between policies a l and a lm , then a l will win only if E(t) < stricter condition. Therefore the minimum requirement for a district to elect l is E(t) < a lm . For l to win a majority of seats, it must be that this condition is met in at least D+1 2 districts. Still with l l < l r ≤ 2l l , note from that the leftmost policy which could be implemented when
is z = a m (this occurs when S = (0,
)). Therefore, in order for the policy z = a r to never come about, we must have E(t D+1 2 ) > a mr . From Table 1 , we can see that these bounds of a lm and a mr will apply no matter what the difference between the three party platforms.
This reaffirms the result of Proposition 2, that moderate coalitions will be the norm in legislative elections unless the population is heavily biased in favour of one of the noncentrist parties. Moreover, bargaining over perks as well as policy can lead to even less extreme policies than the benchmark case. This can be seen from Figure 2 : starting from a point E(S) where E(s l >)
, E(s m ) > 1 and
, the most likely decisive event for each district must be λ(a l , a lm , a lm ). Therefore, such a party l majority could only come about if
-an even stricter requirement than that of the benchmark case. This result is noteworthy as, in U.K. elections at least, the party seat shares tend to be in line with this case: one of the non-centrist parties wins a majority, the other wins more than a quarter of the seats, while the centrist party wins much less than a quarter.
On the other dimension of interest bargaining over policy and perks does not perform as well; the restrictions required to completely rule out misaligned voting are more severe than in the benchmark model. However, as Proposition 6 will show, there are many equilibria in which a large subset of districts have no misaligned voting.
Proposition 5. In a legislative election with a fixed order of bargaining over policy and perks of office, there always exist equilibria with no misaligned voting in any district.
1. When a l and a r are equidistant from the centrist policy, l l = l r , there is no misaligned voting if either party l or party r receive votes in fewer than
2. When a l is closer than a r to the centrist policy, l l < l r , there is no misaligned voting if party r receive votes in fewer than
3. When a l is further than a r to the centrist policy, l l > l r , there is no misaligned voting if party l receive votes in fewer than
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition is the same as in Proposition 3: when a non-centrist party is not a serious candidate in enough districts, there is no hope of it influencing the order of recognition in the legislative bargaining stage. The threshold for relevance is lower than in the benchmark case because under this bargaining protocol the order of parties matters for the policy outcome. From Figure 3 we see that once it is possible for party r to win D−1 4 districts, two distinct decisive events exist: λ(a l , a m , a m ) and λ(a l , a m , a lm ). No matter which of these two events a district focuses on, and which two candidates are serious, some voters in the district will always be casting misaligned votes.
When party l or r have serious candidates in more than
districts we cannot rule out misaligned voting. However, there are equilibria in which there is no misaligned voting in a subset of districts. The following proposition holds for all bargaining rules. 
The proposition is best understood by way of example. Take a λ(2 ) event, for example,
, 2,
). Electing l will give s l > s r > s m resulting in z = a lm , electing r instead will give s r > s l > s m and bring about z = a mr , while electing m will lead to a tie for first place between l and r. A coin toss will decide which of the two policies comes about, but ex ante voters' expectation is E(a lm , a mr ). As voters have concave utility functions, every voter strictly prefers either a lm or a mr to the lottery over the pair. If this decisive event is the most likely (i.e. infinitely more likely than all others) and the district focuses on a race between l and r, nobody in the district is casting a misaligned vote.
To see the second part of the proposition, suppose the most likely decisive event is
). Here, electing l or m gives a lm while electing r brings about a coin toss and an expected policy E(a lm , a mr ). Suppose further that the second most likely decisive event is S −d = (
), where electing m or r gives policy a mr while electing l gives E(a lm , a mr ). In the most likely event, all voters below a certain threshold will be indifferent between electing l and electing m. However, in the second most likely decisive event, all of these voters would prefer to elect l than m. Given that each decisive event is infinitely more likely to occur than a less likely decisive event, these voters need only consider the top two decisive events. Any voter who is indifferent between l and m in the most likely decisive event strictly prefers l in the second most likely. So, if the district focuses on a race between l and r there will be no misaligned voting. Proposition 6 is quite useful, as it holds for any bargaining rule. It will allow me to say that in the next section, even though we cannot get results such as Proposition 3 and Proposition 5, we do not return to the single plurality election case of "always misaligned voting". Instead, there are again many equilibria in which a subset of districts have no misaligned voting.
Impatient Parties
In this section, I examine how the results of the benchmark model change when δ < 1, so that parties are no longer perfectly patient. It is likely that the discount rates of politicians vary across countries depending on things such as constitutional constraints of bargaining, the status quo, and the propensity of politicians to be reelected.
20 In the benchmark model it didn't matter whether the bargaining protocol was random or had a fixed order; a coalition would always implement z = a m . However, once parties discount the future, we get vasty different results depending on which bargaining protocol is used. The scope for policy polarisation and misaligned voting not only depends on how the formateur is selected but also on the location of the status quo policy, Q. I assume the status quo is neither too extreme, Q ∈ (a l , a r ), nor too central Q = a m . 21 In each period where no agreement is reached, the status quo policy remains and enters party's payoff functions. All parties discount the future at the same rate of δ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, if a proposal y is passed in period t, the payoff of party c is
For ease of analysis I assume, without loss of generality, that a m = 0. 22 Banks and Duggan (2000) show that all stationary equilibria are no-delay equilibria and are in pure strategies when the policy space is one-dimensional and δ < 1.
Fixed Order Bargaining
The order of recognition is fixed and follows the ranking of parties' seat shares. In Appendix A, I derive the policy outcomes for any ordering of parties; these are presented in Table 2 below. From the table we see that the further party m moves down the ranking of 20 After the 2010 Belgian elections, legislative bargaining lasted for a record-breaking 541 days, suggesting high values of δ. Conversely, after the 2010 U.K. elections, a coalition government was formed within five days.
21 If Q = a m the result is the same as the benchmark case of δ = 1. 22 Taking any original positions (a l , a m = 0, a r ), we can always alter f so that the preferences of all voter types are the same when (a l , a m = 0, a r ).
seat shares, the further the policy moves away from a m . Figure 4 shows the various policy outcomes for any seat distribution in the legislature. Figure 5 shows the frequency of the three categories of decisive events.
Seat Share
Policy Table 2 : Policy outcomes with fixed order bargaining over policy and δ < 1.
The proposition below shows that when the bargaining protocol is fixed, parties discount the future, and the status quo is not exactly a m , it is even more difficult for a non-centrist party to win a majority of seats and implement its preferred policy than is the case in the benchmark model. Proposition 7. In a legislative election with a fixed order of bargaining over policy, δ < 1 and E(s m ), E(s r ) > 1; z = a l can only be implemented if
As the difference in policy between, say, an l majority government and a coalition led by party l is quite small, the majority government can only come about if the electorate is sufficiently biased in favour of policy a l -even more so than in the benchmark case. 23 The reason is that in the benchmark case every coalition implements z = a m , while with discounting and a fixed order protocol, the largest party has a significant advantage in coalition negotiations and so can use this to get an alternative policy passed. Voters anticipate the power that the leading party l will have in coalition formation and so will only vote to bring about a party l majority if they prefer it to the l led coalition. What the proposition also shows is that the further the status quo policy, Q, is from the median party policy, a m , the 23 It is worth mentioning that without the restriction to E(s r ) > 1 in the proposition, the threshold becomes E(t D+1 2 ) < a lm as in the benchmark case. This is because some districts may then condition on
2 , 0), and have l and m as serious candidates. In such a case l will win the district only if E(t) < a lm . 
P a r t y l = 0 P a r t y r = 0
Figure 4 more likely we are to have coalition governments, all else equal; a more distant status quo gives the formateur even more bargaining power over the median party. Figure 5 shows the frequency of the three types of decisive event for this bargaining rule. While it is quite similar to Figure 3 , the difference is that now there is no condition we can impose so as to ensure there is no misaligned voting. The corner decisive events of Figure 5 are λ(3) events, so at least one of them can always be conditioned on. If a district is conditioning on a λ(3) event there must be misaligned voting in that district. On the other hand, Proposition 6 also holds here -so there are equilibria with misaligned voting in only a subset of districts. The following proposition summaries the state of misaligned voting under this bargaining rule.
Proposition 8. In a legislative election with a fixed order of bargaining over policy and δ < 1, there always exist equilibria with misaligned voting. However, equilibria exist with no misaligned voting in a subset of districts.
Random Recognition Bargaining
In each period one party is randomly selected as formateur, where the probability of each party being chosen is equal to its seat share in the legislature, . Party payoffs are again given by Equation 7. As usual if a party has a majority of seats it will implement its preferred policy. Following Banks and Duggan (2006) , when no party has a majority I look for an equilibrium of the form y l = a m − ∆, y m = a m , y r = a m + ∆. Cho and Duggan (2003) show that this stationary equilibrium is unique. As bargaining is only over policy, any minimum winning coalition will include party m. When there was no discounting this meant party m could always achieve z = a m . Now, however, the presence of discounting allows parties l and r to offer policies further away from a m , which party m will nonetheless support. The median party will be indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer y when
which, when rearranged gives Table 3 shows the equilibrium offer each party will make when chosen as formateur. Notice that the policies offered by l and r depend on the seat share of party m. The more seats party m has, the closer these offers get to zero. For a seat distribution such that no party has a majority, the expected policy outcome Table 3 : Policy proposals with random order bargaining over policy, δ < 1.
from bargaining is
An extra seat for any of the three parties will increase their respective probabilities of being the formateur and so affect the expected policy outcome. Thus, every district always faces a choice between three distinct (expected) policies. We also see that as s m increases, the expected policy moves closer and closer to zero. This occurs for two reasons; firstly because there is a higher probability of party m being the formateur, and secondly because s m enters the policy offers of l and r; as s m increases the absolute value of these policies shrink. The proposition below shows that when the bargaining protocol is random, parties discount the future, and the status quo is not exactly a m , it is easier for a non-centrist party to win a majority of seats and implement its preferred policy than is the case in the benchmark model. The proposition implies that we should witness more majority governments than coalition governments when the bargaining protocol is random. The reason is that with a random recognition rule voters face vast uncertainty if they choose to elect a coalition. The implemented policy will vary greatly depending on which party is randomly chosen as formateur. As voters are risk averse, they find the certainty of policy provided by a majority government appealing. The median voter in the median district need not prefer the policy of a non-centrist party to that of party m in order for the former to win a majority of seats. Along with the previous propositions on polarisation, this proposition shows that no matter which of the bargaining rules is used, there is less scope for polarisation in legislative elections with national voters than there is in presidential elections or legislative elections with local voters. Figure 6 below shows the various decisive cases when the random recognition rule is used. Almost all points are λ(3) events, and as we know, if a district is conditioning on such an event it must have misaligned voting.
24 There are however, a selection of λ (2 ) , then there are many equilibria in which there is misaligned voting in only a subset of districts.
Proposition 10. For any distribution of voter preferences, in a legislative election with a random order of bargaining over policy and δ < 1, there are no equilibria without misaligned voting. However, equilibria exist with only misaligned voting in a subset of districts.
At any decisive event, voters may be conditioning on, they face a choice between three 24 The picture changes somewhat depending on the values of Q, D and δ: for certain values, decisive events where s m is small may be λ(2 ) events or may even be events where all voters would like to elect m. However this does not alter Proposition 10. Figure 6 shows the case of D = 25, δ = 0.99 and |Q| < 0.33. distinct (expected) policies. In almost all cases this means that there will be misaligned voting in the districts. However, as I show in the proof, and as can be seen from Figure 6 , when m is the largest party then the expected policy which comes about by electing the smallest party in the legislature is actually not preferred by any voter type. So, in this case, if a district focuses on the two national frontrunners as the two serious candidates in their district, there will be no misaligned voting. In fact, there may only be misaligned voting in one district. If party m has a majority of seats, party l has one seat, and r has the rest, then as long as all d m and d r districts have m and r as serious candidates, only the one d l district will have misaligned voting. This gives a fresh insight into the idea of "wasted votes": if party l or r is expected to be the smallest of the parties in the legislature, and party m is expected to have a majority, then the least popular national party should optimally be abandoned by voters. Any district which actually elects the weakest national party does so due to a coordination failure; a majority there would instead prefer to elect one of the other two parties. Notice however, that for this to be the case, the median party must be expected to win an overall majority. So, while the idea of a wasted vote does carry some weight, it clearly does not apply to the case of the Liberal Democrats.
Discussion
In this paper, I introduced and analysed a model of three-party competition in legislative elections under plurality rule. I showed that two negative aspects of plurality rulepolarisation and misaligned voting -are significantly reduced when the rule is used to elect a legislature. The degree to which these phenomena are reduced depends on the institutional setup -specifically, on how legislative bargaining occurs.
In the benchmark model, parties are perfectly patient and bargain only over policy. Two clear results emerged from this model. First, while an extreme policy can always come about in a presidential election or legislative election with local voters, in order for a noncentrist policy to be implemented by national voters it needs broad support in the electorate; specifically, the median voter in the median district must prefer the extreme policy to the median party's policy. Second, while standard plurality elections with three distinct choices always have misaligned voting, in my benchmark model this is the case if the non-centrist parties are serious candidates in more than half the districts -otherwise there is no misaligned voting in any district.
The results of the benchmark model largely hold up under the other bargaining rules considered: the non-centrist parties cannot win for any voter preferences (unlike in standard plurality elections), and there are always equilibria in which there is no misaligned voting (at least in a subset of districts). Moreover, if parties are impatient we gain an additional insight: with a fixed order of formateur recognition we should see more coalitions while when the order is random we should see more single-party governments, all else equal.
In the remainder of this section I discuss the robustness of my modelling assumptions. First, if utility functions are concave rather than specifically quadratic, the benchmark model is unchanged. When bargaining also involves perks, the same is true as long as there are enough perks to allow a coalition between the left and right parties to form.
25 Second, if parties bargain by making demands rather than offers, as in Morelli (1999) , the results will be the same as in the benchmark model. 26 Third, if instead of a Poisson model I assumed a fixed population size drawn from a multinomial distribution, the results of my model would still go through.
27
A key assumption is that voters only care about the policy implemented in the legislature. If they also have preferences over who wins their local district, the results of the model no longer hold: the probability of being pivotal locally would outweigh any possible utility gain at the national level so that voters will only consider the local dimension. However, in Westminster systems, a Member of Parliament has no power to implement policy at a local level; he merely serves as an agent of his constituents: bringing up local issues in parliament, helping constituents with housing authority claims, etc. So, if voters do have preferences over their local winner, it should only be on a common-value, valence dimension. If this were indeed the case, party policies would be irrelevant for how voters cast their ballots.
Arguably, the assumption of perfect information is unrealistic in a real world election. The asymptotic elements of the model means voters can perfectly rank the probabilities of certain events. In real life we are never that confident: polls may not be accurate, or more often, polls may not exist at the district level. In the future, I would like to extend the model to include greater aggregate uncertainty over voters' preferences. Finally, the model does not address how party policies are formed nor how the number of competing parties comes about. Endogenising the entry decisions and policy choices of parties would provide a richer model with which to compare different parliamentary systems, and would tackle the question of whether plurality rule really leads to a two-party system, as is often claimed. This is something I wish to address in future research.
25 If the perks are not large enough or parties don't value perks enough, a coalition will always involve the median party and we return to the simpler bargaining over policy case.
26 Whenever there is no clear majority, the head of state selects party m as the first mover, so the coalition policy will be z = a m .
27 Myerson (2000) shows that the magnitude of an event with a multinomial distribution is a simple transformation of its magnitude with a Poisson distribution. This transformation preserves the ordering of events and so this means that the ordering of sets of pivotal and decisive events in my model would remain unchanged, and therefore so would the equilibria.
A Appendix

A.1 Poisson Properties
The number of voters in a district is a Poisson random variable n d with mean n. The probability of having exactly k voters is P r[
. Poisson Voting games exhibit some useful properties. By environmental equivalence, from the perspective of player in the game, the number of other players is also a Poisson random variable n d with mean n. By the decomposition property, the number of voters of type t is Poisson distributed with mean nf d (t), and is independent of the number of other players types. For simplicity here I drop the district subscript. The probability of a vote profile x = (x(l), x(m), x(r)) given voter strategies is
Magnitude Theorem Let an event E be a subset of all possible vote profiles. The magnitude theorem (Myerson (2000) ) states that for a large population of size n, the magnitude of an event, µ(E), is:
where ψ(θ) = θ(1−log(θ))−1. That is, as n → ∞, the magnitude of an event E is simply the magnitude of the most likely vote profile x ∈ E. The magnitude µ(E) ∈ [−1, 0] represents the speed at which the probability of the event goes to zero as n → ∞; the more negative its magnitude, the faster that event's probability converges to zero. Corollary to the Magnitude Theorem If two events E and E' have µ(E) < µ(E ), then their probability ratio converges to zero as n → ∞.
It is possible that two distinct events have the same magnitude. In this case, we must use the offset theorem to compare their relative probabilities. Offset Theorem Take two distinct events, E = E with the same magnitude, then
Suppose we have τ (c 1 ) > τ (c 2 ) > τ (c 3 ), so that the subscript denotes a party's ex-pected ranking in terms of vote share. Maximising Equation 12 subject to the appropriate constraints we get
With a magnitude of zero, by the corollary, the probability of candidate c 1 winning goes to 1 as n gets large. Also, as the magnitude of a pivotal event between c 1 and c 2 is greater than all other pivotal events, a pivotal event between c 1 and c 2 is infinitely more likely than a pivotal event between any other pair as n gets large.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
I first show that voters will only condition on the most likely event in which their vote is pivotal and decisive. Then I show that all strictly perfect equilibria involve only two vote getters in each district. Finally, I show that there are always multiple equilibria.
Let τ be a candidate for equilibrium. It summaries the expected vote shares in each district given the strategies of all player types. A voter of type t in district d, decides how to vote by comparing his expected gain from each ballot, given by Equation 2. In order to exactly compute his expected gain for each ballot, the voter would need to work out the probability of each combination of being both pivotal and decisive, P r[piv d (c, c )]P r[λ i d ] for all c, c ∈ C and i ∈ I. The probability of a particular profile of votes across all districts is
After some manipulation, taking the log of both sides, and taking the limit as n → ∞ we get the magnitude of this profile of votes
Notice that the magnitude of a particular profile of votes across districts, is simply the sum of the magnitudes in each district. So while µ(x d ) ∈ (−1, 0) in a single district, when considering the profile of votes in all districts, x, we have µ(x) ∈ (−D, 0). Just as the magnitude theorem can be used to find the most likely events in a given district, the linear nature of Equation 17 means the exact same approach can be used for events which involve multiple districts. Given τ and a constraint, such as a particular seat distribution, we can easily find the maximum sum of magnitudes for which the constraint holds.
Once the magnitude of an event piv d (c 1 , c 2 )λ i d is greater than all other magnitudes, it is infinitely more likely to occur, so all voters in d will vote for one of the two top candidates c 1 and c 2 . As we can see from Equation 15, this magnitude must be greater than either
I've shown that voters condition on the most likely event in which their vote is pivotal and decisive. I will now show that in all strictly perfect equilibria, the most likely pivotal and decisive event is unique i.e. races are duvergerian. If the decisive event with the largest magnitude λ 1 d is a λ(3) or λ(2 ) event then it is immediate that the most likely pivotal and decisive event is
d is a λ(2) event, then voters will instead focus on a less likely decisive event if they are indifferent between the two serious candidates in the λ 1 d case. Nevertheless, the outcome will once again be duvergerian. Non-Duvergerian outcomes can only occur when the probability of two events with different serious candidates are exactly equal. For the probability of two events to be equal, their magnitudes must be equal, so the following condition must hold
for some combination of candidates c, c , c ∈ C. Now, from Equation 15 we know there is only one case in which two different pivotal events have the same magnitude. That is when τ (c 1 )τ (c 3 ) < τ (c 2 ) 2 so that µ(piv(c 2 , c 3 )) = µ(piv(c 1 , c 3 )) = 3 3 τ (c 1 )τ (c 2 )τ (c 3 ) − 1. This occurs when the least popular candidate has much less support than the other two. For Equation 18 to hold and be the largest magnitude it must be that λ 1 d is of type λ(2). The condition then becomes
If this condition holds, then it is resistant to perturbations, as any change of will have the same effect on both sides; so we have a candidate for a strictly perfect equilibrium which is non-duvergerian. However, while these magnitudes are the same, we can use the offset theorem to see that their probabilities are not. Specifically piv d (c 1 , c 3 ) = piv d (c 2 , c 3 ). We know from the offset theorem that
The magnitudes of these events are the same because the most likely event in which they occur is when all three candidates get exactly the same number of votes. However, the events consist of more than just this event. In an event piv d (c 1 , c 3 ) , candidate c 2 must have the same or fewer votes than the others. Similarly, in an event piv d (c 2 , c 3 ) , candidate c 1 must have the same or fewer votes than the others. By the decomposition property, for any given number of votes c 3 has, c 1 is always more likely to have more votes than c 2 . Therefore, it must be that φ > 1. Returning to the decision of a voter facing
and given that λ c 3 ) ], therefore all voters should focus on this event, which will mean the previous second placed candidates loses all her support to the leading candidate, thus ensuring a duvergerian equilibrium. Therefore, all strictly perfect equilibria involve duvergerian races in every district.
A simple example proves the existence of multiple pure strategy equilibria for any bargaining rule where a majority is needed to implement a policy z. For any f , suppose the right party is never serious in any district. All races will be between l and m. We will have E(S −d l ) = (k − 1, D − k, 0) and E(S −dm ) = (k, D − k − 1, 0) for some k ∈ (0, D). As party r receives no votes, every district must be conditioning on the same decisive event λ = (
, 0). When conditioning on this λ, voters will face a choice between a l , a m , and a third policy which would come about if r wins a seat. All the districts may focus on races between l and m, and so it is indeed an equilibrium. Similarly, it is possible that all districts ignore the left party, and so an equilibrium will have every district conditioning on λ = (0,
), or that all districts ignore the middle party and all condition on λ = (
). These three equilibria always exist for any majoritarian bargaining rule.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Case 1: From Table 1 we see that when l l = l r , the policy outcome will be a m if no party has a majority and m is not that smallest party. Given that there are D districts and all equilibria are duvergerian, there will be 2D serious candidates. Any one party can be serious in at most D districts. Suppose party r is a serious candidate in less than districts and party r comes second, it must be that party l has an overall majority -thus there will be no decisive events. Similarly if party l wins less than
districts and party r comes second, it must be that party m will have an overall majority; again no decisive events. Conditional on r winning less than
districts, the only decisive event is λ(a l , a m , a m ), when l wins
seats and m is the second largest party. Given that only this distinct decisive event exists, all voters must be conditioning on it. As electing m or r in this decisive event brings about the same policy, voters are indifferent between the two. In each district, those with t < a lm will vote v l while those with t > a lm will coordinate on either v m or v r . As long as the latter group coordinate on v r in less than
districts, there is no misaligned voting for any voter in any district. The case of l being a serious candidate in less than
districts is analogous. Case 2: From Table 1 we see that when l l < l r , if
> s l > s m > s r , then the policy outcome will be a m . As shown above, when r is serious in less than
districts, the only distinct decisive case is λ(a l , a m , a m ). All districts will condition on this event and, as before, there is no misaligned voting as long as less than
districts coordinate on a race between l and r.
Case 3: From Table 1 we see that when l r < l l , if districts, the only distinct decisive event is λ(a m , a m , a r ). All districts will condition on this event and there is no misaligned voting as long as less than
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Case 1: Recall that in all λ(2 ) events under this bargaining rule, one of the outcomes is a lottery over the other two and is thus preferred by no voter. The frequency of these events can be seen in Figure 3 . If λ 1 d is a λ(2 ) event, it must be infinitely more likely to occur than any other decisive event, and given that voters are not indifferent between any of the options, whichever option a voter prefers in this case will also be his preferred over all possible decisive events. Every voter prefers one of the two "pure" policies to the lottery over them, so if acting unilaterally would never choose the lottery candidate. Therefore, as long as the lottery candidate is not one of the serious candidates, there is no misaligned voting in that district.
Case 2: Let the most likely decisive event λ Here, I take it to be the former. Without loss of generality let z 1 (c) < z 1 (c ). Any voter type with t > z 1 (c)+z 1 (c ) 2
will vote v c , while any voter type will vote v c . The former group cannot be casting misaligned votes as they have u t (z 1 (c )) > u t (z 1 (c)), and decisive event λ 1 d
is infinitely more likely than all others. Next, we need to consider whether any of the voters choosing v c might be misaligned. All of these voters have u t (z 1 (c)) = u t (z 1 (c )) > u t (z 1 (c )), so that they want to beat c but are indifferent between c and c in this most likely decisive event. If one of these voters could unilaterally decide which candidate coordination takes place on, he would decide by looking at the most likely pivotal event in which z(c) = z(c ), call this event 
when c and c are the serious candidates, then there is no misaligned voting in the district.
A.5 Bargaining Equilibrium for Fixed Order Protocol and δ < 1
As equilibria are stationary we need only consider two orderings: l > r > m > l > r > . . . and r > l > m > r > l > . . .. I will derive the equilibrium offers for the case of l > r > m, the other is almost identical. I solve the game by backward induction. At stage 3, party m will make an offer y m which maximises its payoff subject to the proposal being accepted by either party l or r.
At stage 2, party r will either make an offer y r (m) to attract party m, or an offer y r (l) to attract party l. For these proposals to be accepted by m and l respectively requires
If y r (m) is chosen then the first inequality will bind and we have y r (m) = (1 − δ)Q 2 + δy 2 m . We can now compare the payoff of party l when y r (m) and y r (l) are implemented.
Party l prefers policy y r (l) when
the final inequality always holds. As party l gets a higher payoff from y r (l) than y r (m), the former must be closer to a l on the policy line, and therefore further away from a r . Clearly then, party r maximises its utility by choosing y r = (1 − δ)Q 2 + δy 2 m . At stage 1, party l will either make an offer y l (m) to attract party m, or an offer y l (r) to attract party r. For these proposals to be accepted by m and r respectively requires (1 − δ)2a r Q + δ2a r (1 − δ)Q 2 + δy m > −2a r (1 − δ 2 Q 2 + δ 2 y 2 m ) (1 − δ)Q + δ (1 − δ)Q 2 + δy m > − (1 − δ 2 Q 2 + δ 2 y 2 m ) the final inequality always holds. As party r gets a higher payoff from y l (r) than y l (m), the former must be closer to a r on the policy line, and therefore further away from a l . Clearly then, party l maximises its utility by choosing y l = − (1 − δ 2 )Q 2 + δ 2 y 2 m . Now, we can return to stage 3 to show that y m = 0. By stationarity, if y m is rejected at stage 3, then in stage 4 y l = − (1 − δ 2 )Q 2 + δ 2 y 2 m will be proposed and accepted. Parties l and r will accept proposal y m if −(a l − y m ) 2 ≥ −(1 − δ)(a l − Q) 2 − δ(a l + (1 − δ 2 )Q 2 + δ 2 y 2 m ) 2 −(a r − y m ) 2 ≥ −(1 − δ)(a r − Q) 2 − δ(a r + (1 − δ 2 )Q 2 + δ 2 y 2 m ) 2 Party m's payoff is maximised when y m = 0 (because a m = 0), so we want to check whether this is an implementable proposal. Letting y m = 0 and rearranging, the two inequalities above become
The term in square brackets may be positive or negative. If it is positive then, party r will accept y m = 0, if the term is negative then party l will accept y m = 0. Whenever δ > 0.543689 then the term is positive. Given that we mostly care about values of δ close to one, we can say that it is generally party r who accepts m's offer. Given y m = 0, we can now characterise the accepted policy proposals (and therefore policy outcomes) for the fixed order protocol when l > r > m > l > r > . . .. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
For z = a l to be implemented it must be that E(s l ) > D−1 2
. Given the restriction that E(s m ), E(s r ) > 1, the set of distinct decisive events which d l districts can be conditioning on is reduced to Λ = {λ(a l , − (1 − δ 2 )Q 2 , − (1 − δ 2 )Q 2 ), λ(a l , − (1 − δ 2 )Q 2 , − (1 − δ)Q 2 ), λ(a l , − (1 − δ)Q 2 , − (1 − δ)Q 2 )} Any race between a l and − (1 − δ)Q 2 , where the former is the expected winner, must have E(t) < . Any race between a l and − (1 − δ 2 )Q 2 , where the former is the expected winner, must have E(t) <
, a stricter condition. Therefore in order to for a party l majority to come about when E(s m ), E(s r ) > 1 it must be at least that
. Notice that since − (1 − δ)Q 2 < a m , then 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose party l is expected to win a majority. Then E(S) must be in the bottom left section of Figure 6 . Each of the decisive events are distinct as by increasing a party's seat share by one, it alters the expected policy outcome E(z). Each district must be conditioning on a decisive event where s l = D−1 2
. Given this, the policy choice of the district depends on the number of seats m and r have. A larger number of r seats implies a smaller number of m seats. The larger number of r seats means a higher likelihood of a policy to the right of a m , and on top of this a smaller number of m seats means the policies offered by parties l and r are further from a m . Therefore, given s m > 0, the furthest expected policy from a l must be at the point λ = ( These inequalities will generally hold (they may not hold if Q and D are sufficiently large, and s m is sufficiently small). If these conditions hold, the three types have three different preferred candidates, so will be misaligned voting. However, even if they do not hold, there cannot be an equilibrium without misaligned voting, for the following reason: a d r district conditions on r having less seats than a d l district conditions on (Graphically, E(D −dr ) is one point to the left of E(D −d l )). So, if at point E(D −dr ) a t = 1 voter prefers r to m, then for sure the same type at E(D −d l ) would also prefer r to m. Hence, at at least one of the three E(S −d ) points which make up an equilibrium there will be voters who prefer each of the three parties. Therefore, there will be misaligned voting. . In such cases the expected utility of a type t voter is
Note that for t = 0 we have u t (m) > u t (l) = u t (r). Any voter type with t < 0 has u t (l) > u t (r), while any voter with t > 0 has u t (l) < u t (r). However, it could be that some of these types prefer u t (m) to either of the other two. In order to check this I calculate the derivative of each of the expected utilities with respect to t.
then for any t < 0 we have
. Combined, with the fact that we have u t (m) > u t (l) = u t (r) for t = 0, this means that for s l < D−3 4
there is no type with u t (l) > u t (m), u t (r). When s l > D+1 4 then for any t > 0 we have
. Combined, with the fact that we have u t (m) > u t (l) = u t (r) for t = 0, this means that for
there is no type with u t (r) > u t (m), u t (l). What this means is that, conditional on s m =
